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TORTS – PRODUCT LIABILITY: 
NORTH DAKOTA REJECTS THE APPARENT 
MANUFACTURER DOCTRINE 
Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
rejected the application of the apparent manufacturer products liability 
doctrine.  The doctrine imposes product liability on a seller for products 
manufactured by another, but for the original seller’s purpose.  Unless 
prevented by statute, most jurisdictions have incorporated the doctrine.  
This holding reversed Reiss v. Komatsu America Corp., where the United 
States Federal District Court of North Dakota determined the state would 
accept the doctrine.  The North Dakota Supreme Court found the North 
Dakota Legislative Assembly’s adoption of tort reform law intended to 
restrict an individual’s ability to file suit against a nonmanufacturing seller 
for injuries arising out of defective products.  Key in this finding was the 
ability of nonmanufacturing sellers to shift liability to the original 
manufacturer under certain circumstances.  The practical effect is an 
increased likelihood of federal product liability cases being filed in a 
jurisdiction outside of North Dakota.  As a result, plaintiffs will need to 
consider not only the acceptance of this doctrine in other jurisdictions, but 
also the choice of law test established in the original filing jurisdiction. 
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I. FACTS 
Nathan Bornsen purchased a Cabela’s labeled meat grinder from a 
Cabela’s retail store in East Grand Forks, Minnesota, for use in his venison 
processing business located in Larimore, North Dakota.1  On November 21, 
2007, while operating the grinder purchased by her husband, Ruth 
Bornsen’s left hand was pulled into the grinder, resulting in four of her 
 
1. Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, ¶ 2, 804 N.W.2d 55. 
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fingers being severed.2  The Bornsens determined Pragotrade, Inc. and 
Pragotrade, LLC, as its successor, were the manufacturers of the grinder, 
and Cabela’s was the seller.3  The Bornsens filed suit in North Dakota state 
court against Pragotrade and Cabela’s, claiming Pragotrade and Cabela’s 
are liable for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty claims.4  
Cabela’s filed a motion on July 20, 2010, removing the case to the United 
States Court for the District of North Dakota.5 
Subsequent to the removal motion, Cabela’s filed a motion to dismiss 
the Plaintiff’s alleged product liability claim under North Dakota Century 
Code section 28-01.3-04, claiming Cabela’s was a nonmanufacturing seller 
of the grinder.6  The Bornsens alleged the grinder had a design defect due to 
large dimensions of the grinder opening, and Cabela’s failed to properly 
warn the consumer of this defect.7  In its motion, Cabela’s claimed 
Pragotrade was the manufacturer; however, Pragotrade denied it was the 
manufacturer, but admitted assisting in designing and distributing the 
grinder.8  The Bornsens alleged Cabela’s was an apparent manufacturer of 
the product and should be liable.9  Federal District Court Chief Judge Ralph 
Erickson considered the motion and rejected the Bornsens’ argument, based 
on Reiss v. Komatsu America Corp.,10 that the North Dakota Supreme Court 
would adopt the apparent manufacturing doctrine, and therefore, the federal 
court should use the doctrine.11  Instead of ruling on the motion to dismiss, 
Chief Judge Erickson filed an Order of Certification, pursuant to North 
Dakota Rule of Appellate Procedure 47, requesting the North Dakota 
Supreme Court provide a determination of whether the apparent 
manufacturer doctrine is part of North Dakota law.12 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
North Dakota products liability statutes establish distinct definitions for 
both a manufacturer and a seller.13  A manufacturer is defined as “a person 
 
2. Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, ¶ 5, 804 N.W.2d 55, 57; Brief for Appellants ¶ 
1, Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55 (No. 20110087). 
3. Bornsen, ¶ 2, 804 N.W.2d at 56; Brief for Appellee at 4, Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 
ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55 (No. 20110087). 
4. Bornsen, ¶ 2; Brief for Appellee, supra note 3, at 4. 
5. Bornsen, ¶ 2; Brief for Appellants, supra note 2, ¶ 3. 
6. Bornsen, ¶ 3. 
7. Id. ¶ 5, 804 N.W.2d at 57. 
8. Id. ¶ 3, 804 N.W.2d at 56. 
9. Id. ¶ 4, 804 N.W.2d at 57. 
10. 735 F. Supp.2d 1125 (2010). 
11. Bornsen, ¶ 5. 
12. Id. 
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-01(1), (3) (2006). 
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or entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, constructs, or 
otherwise prepares a product or a component part of a product prior to the 
sale of the product to a user or consumer.”14  Seller is defined as “any 
individual or entity, including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or 
retailer, who is engaged in the business of selling or leasing any product for 
resale, use, or consumption.”15  These definitions distinguish 
nonmanufacturing sellers and can prevent a products liability claim against 
the entity if it can:  (1) correctly identify the actual manufacturer, (2) not 
exercise control over the design, manufacture or warning of the product, (3) 
had no knowledge of the design defect, (4) did not cause the defect, and (5) 
the plaintiff’s claim is not barred against the identified manufacturer due to 
the appropriate statute of limitations.16 
The apparent manufacturer doctrine creates the same liability imposed 
on a manufacturer of a defective product for any entity that sells a product 
for its own purposes, even though it was manufactured by another.17  
Pursuant to the certified question submitted to the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, it remained to be resolved whether the apparent manufacturer 
doctrine would be adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  This 
determination would be based on what the North Dakota Legislature 
intended when it adopted product liability reform legislation and whether 
that language was exclusive under the statute.18 
A. HISTORY OF APPARENT MANUFACTURER DOCTRINE 
The apparent manufacturer doctrine provides strict liability for a seller 
of a defective product, even though the seller did not manufacture the 
product, and is traced back to early common law decisions and the 
American Law Institute’s (ALI’s) published Restatement (First) of Torts.19  
While there has been controversy surrounding the overall development of 
strict liability as pertaining to manufactured products, the apparent 
manufacturer doctrine has remained in later publications of the ALI’s views 
on torts.20 
 
14. Id. § 28-01.3-01(1). 
15. Id. § 28-01.3-01(3). 
16. Id. § 28-01.3-04(1)-(3). 
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 14 (1998). 
18. See infra Part II.A.3. 
19. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 400 (1934) (imposing liability on a 
vendor selling a product made by another). 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
PRODS. LIAB. § 14 (1998).  See generally Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product be Liable?, 45 
DUKE L.J. 1, 3-4 (1995) (critizing the imposition of liability on a product); Marshall S. Shapo, The 
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The policy reason for adopting a doctrine of nonmanufacturing seller’s 
product liability is based on establishing privity of the consumer harmed by 
the product with the end retailer or distributor from whom the product was 
purchased.21  In addition, the doctrine prevents a vendor from advertising a 
product as its own and having consumers rely on the vendor’s reputation, 
but subsequently allowing the vendor to deny it is the actual manufacturer 
should problems arise with the product.22  The seller is estopped from 
denying it was the manufacturer when a buyer has no reasonable means to 
determine the true manufacturer, and the seller concealed that identity to the 
buyer.23  While these reasons form the basis for adoption of the doctrine, 
other legal methods exist to identify the true manufacturer,24 and plaintiffs 
have additional legal remedies for harm suffered from defective products.25 
1. Restatement Interpretation 
The most recent codified language of the apparent manufacturer 
doctrine treats any entity “engaged in the business of selling or otherwise 
distributing products who sells or distributes as its own a product 
manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though the seller 
or distributor were the product’s manufacturer.”26  This relatively recent 
change clarifies the prior rule requiring anyone “who puts out as his own 
product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as 
though he were its manufacturer.”27  The change reflects a reform of the 
prior strict liability rule for defective products incorporated under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402(A), which subsumed the prior 
mentioned section in regard to products liability.28 
Two specific provisions of the rule stand out in this case.  First, the 
ALI envisioned a situation where state statutes on products liability would 
treat nonmanufacturing sellers of a product more leniently than the true 
 
Law of Products Liability:  The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 646-51 (1995) 
(discussing state product liability doctrines at odds with the restatement version). 
21. Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability:  A Proposal for Change, 
55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2003) (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS § 9A, at 715 (7th ed. 2000)). 
22. AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3d § 6:2 (2005). 
23. Id. 
24. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-04(1) (2006) (imposing liability on nonmanufacturing 
seller unless certified identification of actual manufacturer). 
25. Lana Steven, Torts: Products Liability, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (1998). 
(discussing liability under agency, fraud, and misrepresentation claims). 
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 14 (1998). 
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965). 
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 14 cmt. a (1998).  See generally 2 AM. 
LAW INST., REPORTER’S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991). 
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manufacturer, and to the extent a statute alters liability, the statute 
supersedes the common law.29  Second, when a nonmanufacturing seller 
represents a product as its own, the seller is liable as if it manufactured the 
product based on the buyer’s reliance on the seller’s reputation to assure the 
quality of the product.30 
2. Acceptance by Other Jurisdictions 
At least twenty-three states have adopted some form of strict liability 
for defective products on any retailer of a product manufactured by 
another.31  Prior to this decision, and the restructuring of the apparent 
manufacturer doctrine rule under the Restatement, both Michigan and 
Georgia specifically rejected the doctrine.32  Michigan’s rejection of the 
doctrine was based upon findings of additional theories of tort doctrine 
imposing liability on a seller of defective products, including the ability of 
the plaintiff to impose liability through laws on agency, fraud and 
misrepresentation, as well as piercing the corporate veil on a successor 
entity.33  The Michigan Supreme Court found existing protections for 
consumers to pursue defective product claims were sufficient, and refused 
to accept the apparent manufacturer doctrine as other available remedies 
were available and adoption of the doctrine would be redundant.34 
 
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 14 cmt. b (1998). 
30. Id. cmt. c. 
31. See generally Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 787 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(applying Massachusetts law); Brock v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Ala. 
2000) (applying Alabama law); Davis v. United States Gauge, 844 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Kan. 1994) 
(applying Kansas law); Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973) 
(applying Pennsylvania Law); Dildine v. Clark Equip. Co., 666 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. 1984); Cravens, 
Dargan & Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d. 594 (1973); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 
161 A. 385 (Conn. 1932), overruled in part on other grounds by Porpora v. City of New Haven, 
187 A. 668 (Conn. 1936), and overruled on other grounds by Perlstein v. Westport Sanitarium 
Co., 11 Conn. Supp. 117, 1942 WL 859 (Super. Ct. 1942); Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 
199 (Ill. 1982); Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Wagner v. 
Larson, 136 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 1965); Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So.2d 926 (La. 
1978); Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 9 A.2d 572 (Md. 1939); Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 
221 (Mich. 1995); Tiedje v. Haney, 239 N.W. 611 (Minn. 1931); Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc. of 
Vicksburg v. Reeves, 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986); Swindler v. Butler Mfg. Co., 426 S.W.2d 78 
(Mo. 1968); Slavin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co., 177 A. 120 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1935); Willson v. 
Faxon, Williams & Faxon, 101 N.E. 799 (N.Y. 1913); Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co., 56 S.E.2d 689 (N.C. 1949); Saum v. Venick, 293 N.E.2d 313 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972); Benford 
v. Berkeley Heating Co., 188 S.E.2d 841 (S.C. 1972); First Am. Nat’l Bank v. Evans, 417 S.W.2d 
778 (Tenn. 1967); S. Blickman, Inc. v. Chilton, 114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1938); 
Zamora v. Mobil Corp., 704 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1985); AM. L. PROD. LIAB., supra note 22, § 6:2 
n.1. 
32. Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 222; Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas of Ga., Inc., 807 F. 
Supp. 1533, 1539-40 (M.D. Ga. 1992). 
33. Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 224. 
34. Id. 
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Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed partial summary 
judgment dismissing strict liability claims for two retailers alleged to be 
manufacturers selling defective propane cylinders, which resulted in an 
explosion injuring a homeowner.35  The Georgia Supreme Court interpreted 
the state statutory scheme on products liability to apply only to actual 
manufacturers based on the language of the Georgia Tort Reform Act of 
1987, which eliminated product liability claims on “a broad category of 
entities that had no real role in the creation of products.”36  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court made a similar determination in this case, relying on 
the statutory scheme to reject adoption of the doctrine. 
3. North Dakota Statutory Changes to Products Liability Law 
North Dakota, like Georgia, enacted tort reform legislation in the 1980s 
to address product liability suits.37  North Dakota amended products 
liability law under North Dakota Century Code section 28-01.3-01 to -04, 
which prevents nonmanufacturing seller liability in defective product 
claims.38  One of the initial committee meetings on the reform bill indicated 
the express desire of the legislative members to reduce insurance premiums 
for businesses within the state, promote economic growth, and prevent large 
financial claims against retailers.39  However, no discussion was made as to 
whether this protection was intended to shield out-of-state companies from 
liability.40 
B. REISS V. KOMATSU AMERICA CORP. 
In a prior decision, a federal district court in North Dakota decided 
North Dakota would likely recognize the apparent manufacturer doctrine.41  
In a case before Judge Daniel Hovland, authoring the opinion, the court 
considered a product liability claim on the sale of construction equipment 
without a rollover protection structure.42  The immediate seller, Diesel 
Machinery, leased a heavy construction vehicle to Mariner Construction.43  
 
35. Freeman, 807 F. Supp. at 1539-40. 
36. Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (2000). 
37. 1987 N.D. Laws 954. 
38. 1993 N.D. Laws 1120. 
39. Hearing on S.B. 2351 Before the S. Judiciary Comm, N.D. Leg. Assemb. (1993) 
(statements of S. Harvey Tallackson, R. Doug Payne, S. Jim Dotzenrod, & S. Joe Keller). 
40. See generally id. 
41. Reiss v. Komatsu Am. Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (D.N.D. 2010). 
42. Id. at 1138. 
43. Id. at 1129. 
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Diesel Machinery acquired the vehicle from the Galion Division of Dress 
Industries, Inc., which was the precursor company of Komatsu.44 
Henry Reiss was an employee of Mariner Construction and died as a 
result of a rollover on the equipment.45  Pearl Reiss filed a wrongful death 
suit in North Dakota state court against Mariner Construction and 
Komatsu.46  Defendants filed a motion to remove the action to federal court 
and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment denying liability 
based on its status under North Dakota Century Code section 28-01.3-04 as 
a nonmanufacturing seller.47  In complying with North Dakota Century 
Code section 28-01.3-04, Diesel Machinery filed an affidavit stating 
Komatsu, as successor to Dress Industries, was the actual manufacturer, 
with Komatsu asserting the true manufacturer was Tema Terra Maquinaria 
Ltda., a Brazilian company.48 
The court rejected Komatsu’s claim of protection under section 28-
01.3-04, citing extensive non-North Dakota case law in which other 
jurisdictions adopted the apparent manufacturer doctrine.49  The court found 
Komatsu was the equipment’s manufacturer based on the vehicle’s decals, 
operator’s manual, warranty materials, and sales brochure all indicating the 
manufacturer was Dresser Industries/Komatsu, and this representation to 
the public under the apparent manufacturer doctrine imposed liability on 
Komatsu.50  In making the determination, the court determined the statutory 
language was not a bar against adoption of the apparent manufacturer 
doctrine,51 as the North Dakota Supreme Court had previously adopted 
other Restatement sections on strict liability in products liability actions, 
and had not yet considered a case where the doctrine was accepted.52  Based 
on this reasoning, the court accepted the doctrine under North Dakota law 
and believed that the North Dakota Supreme Court would do likewise if 
presented with an opportunity to consider the matter.53 
III. ANALYSIS 
In answering the certified question, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
considered two separate issues.  First, whether the question from the United 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 1130. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 1130-32. 
48. Id. at 1133. 
49. Id. at 1133-34. 
50. Id. at 1134. 
51. Id. at 1133. 
52. Id. at 1132. 
53. Id. at 1133. 
          
2012] CASE COMMENT 485 
States District Court of North Dakota was properly certified pursuant to the 
North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure.54  Second, whether the court 
would adopt the apparent manufacturer products liability doctrine.55  
Writing for the majority, Justice Crothers, with Chief Justice VandeWalle 
and Justice Sandstrom concurring, determined the question was properly 
certified from the United States District Court, and that the apparent 
manufacture doctrine is not supported under North Dakota law.56 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s opinion centered on the intent of 
the North Dakota Legislature in amending products liability law.  Based on 
this intent, the court ultimately rejected the doctrine.  The current law 
allowing a nonmanufacturing entity to escape liability precluded adoption 
of the doctrine and would counter the intent of the legislature in limiting the 
ability of individuals to file product liability claims. 
1. Rejection of Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine Under 
 Common Law 
The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to the statute in question to 
determine whether the North Dakota Legislature precluded adoption of the 
apparent manufacturer doctrine.57  The majority cited the text of North 
Dakota Century Code section 28-01.3-01 indicating separate definitions for 
“manufacturer” and “seller.”58  The court also looked to North Dakota 
Century Code section 28-01.3-04, which provides a separate liability 
section for nonmanufacturing sellers.59  The court found these two 
provisions indicated the legislature’s intent to restrict product liability 
actions as a remedy for harm caused by defective products.60  The court 
considered the statutory scheme so comprehensive that adoption of the 
apparent manufacturer doctrine could not be recognized without 
contravening the legislative intent in adopting the statute.61  The court cited 
the specific conflict between common law and statutory language 
 
54. Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, ¶ 10, 804 N.W.2d 55, 59. 
55. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10-11, 804 N.W.2d at 56, 59. 
56. Id. ¶¶ 10, 19, 804 N.W.2d at 59, 62. 
57. See infra Part III.B on discussion of proper certification of the question considered by the 
North Dakota Supreme Court. 
58. Bornsen, ¶ 13, 804 N.W.2d at 59. 
59. Id. at 59-60. 
60. Id. ¶ 17, 804 N.W.2d at 61. 
61. Id.; see infra Part III.A.2 for discussion on the legislative intent findings. 
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anticipated by the drafters under the Restatement.62  The ALI indicated that 
statutory provisions differentiating retail sellers from manufacturers, where 
enacted in a relevant jurisdiction, would override common law doctrine 
imposing liability.63 
1. Interpretation of North Dakota Century Code Based on 
 Statutory Language and Legislative Intent 
In reaching its decision on the rejection of the apparent manufacturer 
doctrine, the North Dakota Supreme Court cited state law and precedent to 
interpret legislative intent.64  This indication by the Legislature requires 
“the law of [North Dakota] respecting the subjects to which it relates, and 
its provisions and all proceedings under it are to be construed liberally, with 
a view to effecting its objects and to promoting justice.”65  Additionally, 
North Dakota law requires no common law consideration may be made in a 
case where the law has been declared by statute.66 
In interpreting North Dakota’s products liability statutes, the court has 
stated “it is for the legislature to determine policy, not the courts”67 and 
“noted that ‘[i]t must be presumed that the legislature intended all that it 
said, and that it said all that it intended to say.’”68  The Bornsens argued that 
prior legislative action in 1979 to preempt private labelers from liability 
later removed in 1987, demonstrated intent on the part of the legislature to 
allow for adoption of the apparent manufacturer doctrine.69  The argument 
was premised on North Dakota precedent requiring courts to find legislative 
purpose in all revisions and changes to prior statutes, and this repeal 
suggested private labelers could be found liable.70  However, the court 
looked specifically to the legislative findings within the statute to determine 
the North Dakota Legislature sought to establish “clear and predictable” 
rules.71  These clear and predictable rules would preclude the adoption of 
 
62. Bornsen, ¶ 18, 804 N.W.2d at 62 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. 
§ 14 (1998)). 
63. Id. ¶ 18; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIAB. § 14 cmt. b (1998). 
64. Bornsen, ¶¶ 14-16, 804 N.W.2d at 60-61. 
65. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (2008). 
66. Id. § 1-01-06. 
67. Bornsen, ¶ 14, 804 N.W.2d at 60 (quoting Treiber v. Citizens State Bank, 1999 ND 130, 
¶ 16, 598 N.W.2d 96, 100). 
68. Id. (quoting City of Dickinson v. Thress, 290 N.W. 653, 657 (1940)). 
69. Bornsen, ¶ 11, 804 N.W.2d at 59; Briefs of Appellants, supra note 2, ¶ 14; Reply Brief 
for Appellants ¶¶ 24-25, Bornsen v. Pragotrade, 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55 (No. 20110087). 
70. Bornsen, ¶ 11, 804 N.W.2d at 59; Brief for Appellants, supra note 2, ¶¶ 14-15, Reply 
Brief for Appellants, supra note 69, ¶¶ 24-25. 
71. Bornsen, ¶¶ 16-17, 804 N.W.2d at 61. 
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the common law apparent manufacturer doctrine in product liability 
claims.72 
B. DISSENT ON ACCEPTANCE OF CERTIFICATION ORDER 
Under the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court may answer certified questions from, among others, 
a federal district court involving questions of state law that may be 
determinative in a proceeding where it appears no controlling precedent has 
occurred in the decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court.73  Justice 
Kapsner, dissenting from this part of the majority’s analysis, did not feel the 
court should take up the question in this case.74  This is based on the 
findings from the United States District Court of North Dakota that 
indicated the decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court would be 
determinative as to the claim made by the Bornsens.75 
Justice Crothers, writing for the majority, touched on this controversy 
by detailing the different standards applicable to North Dakota state courts 
compared to other courts seeking a certified answer to a question of North 
Dakota law.76  Under North Dakota Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1, 
applicable to North Dakota state courts, the certified question of law must 
determine the outcome of the case.77  Under Rule 47, applicable to other 
state appellate courts and federal courts, the certified question of law need 
not be determinative.78  The public policy purpose for a higher standard 
requiring the question be determinative for North Dakota courts as opposed 
to foreign courts is due to the ability of either party to appeal any decision 
to the North Dakota Supreme Court on questions of law, while a party to a 
foreign court has no such remedy.79  In this instance, the certifying court 
was based on a foreign jurisdiction, but certified the question as “being 
determinative” which exceeded the standard required under the North 
Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure.80  The question did not provide 
sufficient facts as to why the question would be determinative, outside of 
the inference made by Chief Judge Erickson’s opinion that the apparent 
manufacturer doctrine would not be adopted.81 
 
72. Id. 
73. N.D. R. APP. P. 47(a). 
74. Bornsen, ¶¶ 21-28, 802 N.W.2d at 62 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
75. Id. ¶ 8, 804 N.W.2d at 58 (majority opinion). 
76. Id. ¶ 7 (citing N.D. R. APP. P. 47.1(a)(1)(A)). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. (citing McKenzie County v. Hodel, 467 N.W.2d 701, 704 (N.D. 1991)). 
80. Id. ¶ 10, 804 N.W.2d at 59. 
81. Id. 
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Justice Crothers did not address the issue due to the importance of the 
question involved to state tort doctrine and the clear division within the 
United States District Court of North Dakota.82  Justice Kapsner disagreed 
with the acceptance of the certification order, citing case law originating 
from the model rule,83 upon which North Dakota’s rule is based, and 
explaining the North Dakota Supreme Court has discretionary authority to 
reject the certification order.84  Along with the discretionary nature granted 
to the court, Justice Kapsner indicated the lack of all relevant facts to make 
an informed decision does not meet the standard required to allow 
acceptance of the certified order, and she believed the order should have 
been denied.85 
IV. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA PRACTITIONERS 
The results of this case require practitioners to consider two important 
issues before pursuing or defending any claim.  First, do the circumstances 
of the case implicate an apparent manufacturer will automatically be a 
defendant?  Second, if an apparent manufacturer is implicated, can the suit 
be filed in a jurisdiction outside North Dakota?  Conversely, in regards to a 
defendant, can a suit outside of North Dakota either be transferred back 
within the state or have a choice of law analysis apply North Dakota law?  
As part of this consideration, a practitioner must consider the original 
jurisdiction’s choice of law analysis regardless of any possible transfer. 
A. REJECTION OF DOCTRINE 
The practical consideration for practitioners within North Dakota is the 
inability of the apparent manufacturer doctrine to be used as a cause of 
action within the state, or alternatively, whether North Dakota Century 
Code section 28-0.13-04 serves as a defense against liability for suit filed 
against one’s client.86  With the rejection of the apparent manufacturer 
doctrine, North Dakota retailers selling a product with a trademark or brand 
of the seller may deny it is a manufacturer.87  Estoppel against a retailer 
denying the manufacture of the product is limited in North Dakota under 
 
82. Id. 
83. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 66 (1967). 
84. Bornsen, ¶ 23-24, 804 N.W.2d at 62-63 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (citing Atlas Life Ins. 
Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 566 (1939); NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23, 24 (1941)).  
85. Id. ¶ 27, 804 N.W.2d at 64. 
86. See supra Part III.A. 
87. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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this ruling,88 but does require the nonmanufacturing seller to correctly 
identify the true manufacturer.89 
For retailers conducting business in North Dakota, the decision will 
reduce the likelihood of a successful product liability action for any 
defective product sold.  This applies so long as the retailer is in compliance 
with provisions of North Dakota Century Code section 28-01.3-04 requiring 
the accurate identification of the actual manufacturer.  The seller must also 
assert it did not create the defect, did not control the design or 
manufacturing of the product, and had no actual knowledge of the defect.90  
The opinion also does not bar additional claims made by a plaintiff as 
indicated in other jurisdictions that have similarly rejected the apparent 
manufacturer doctrine.91 
B. CHOICE OF LAW CONSIDERATIONS 
North Dakota has become an outlier in not adopting the apparent 
manufacturer doctrine compared to most other states.92  This creates an 
important decision for practitioners choosing an appropriate venue and 
choice of law when filing suit or defending a products liability claim 
involving nonmanufacturing sellers.  With federal law establishing criteria 
as to the applicability of a state’s choice of law analysis, this initial decision 
will ultimately decide the success of the case. 
1. Choice of Venue Options for the Bornsens 
In this case, the Bornsens had possible venues outside of North Dakota 
in which to bring a products liability claim, including the location of sale 
(Minnesota), and the location of the seller’s headquarters (Nebraska).93  
Minnesota has a statute similar to North Dakota providing 
nonmanufacturing retailers a defense from products liability action.94  As in 
North Dakota, Minnesota allows a seller to escape liability if the true 
manufacturer is identified and the seller has no significant control over the 
design or manufacture of the product, had no actual knowledge of the 
defect, and did not create the defect.95  However, Minnesota allows a 
 
88. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
89. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra note 16 and accompanying text 
91. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra Part II.A.2. 
93. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 2, ¶ 1; Cabela’s Retail Inc. is headquartered in 
Sidney, Nebraska.  Investor’s Relations Company Overview, CABELA’S, http://phx.corporate-ir.net 
/phoenix.zhtml?c=177739&p=irol-irhome (last visited Dec. 7, 2012). 
94. MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2010). 
95. Id. § 544.41 subdiv. (3). 
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plaintiff to return to the nonmanufacturing seller if the true manufacturer 
cannot satisfy a reasonable settlement or judgment as determined by the 
court.96  This has provided plaintiffs an avenue to pursue a claim against a 
nonmanufacturing seller that would otherwise be denied.97  However, 
nothing in the Bornsen record indicates an exception to the Minnesota 
statute imposing liability on Cabela’s. 
Nebraska’s statutory scheme appears to prohibit adoption of the 
apparent manufacturer doctrine, as product liability actions are prohibited 
“against any seller or lessor of a product which is alleged to contain or 
possess a defective condition” unless the seller has manufactured the 
product or defective part.98  However, both the Nebraska Supreme Court 
and United States District Court of Nebraska have declined to consider 
whether this statute specifically precludes adoption of the doctrine.99  As 
such, a filing by the Bornsens in Nebraska would not necessarily change the 
result of the suit. 
2. Importance of the Original Venue in Choice of Law Analysis 
With precedent set by the rejection of the apparent manufacturer 
doctrine in North Dakota, practitioners considering filing a products 
liability action may consider a forum outside of North Dakota as a venue 
for the claim.  If the action is made in federal district court based on 
diversity jurisdiction, or removed from a state court, the law applicable in 
the original forum will follow even if the venue is transferred.100  This 
includes the choice of law analysis of the original forum state.101 
For example, if a claim is made in the United States Federal District 
Court of Minnesota, and subsequently transferred to North Dakota, the 
North Dakota Federal District Court is required to use the Minnesota choice 
of law analysis.102  For Minnesota, this is the significant contacts test 
requiring an analysis of five choice-influencing factors including:  “(1) 
Predictability of results; (2) Maintenance of interstate and international 
order; (3) Simplification of the judicial task, (4) Advancement of the 
 
96. Id. § 544.41 subdiv. (2)(e). 
97. Finke v. Hunter’s View, Ltd., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1270-71 (D. Minn. 2009). 
98. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 181 (2008). 
99. Sherman v. Sunsong Am., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1079-80 (D. Neb. 2007); Stones v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 558 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Neb. 1997). 
100. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990). 
101. Id.; Eggleton v. Plasser & Theurer Export Von Bahnbaumaschinen Gesellschaft, MBH, 
495 F.3d 582, 585-86 (8th Cir. 2007). 
102. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kamrath, 475 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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forum’s governmental interest; and (5) Application of the better rule of 
law.”103 
Predictability of results relates to the ideal outcome that a claim with 
the same facts will be decided the same regardless of the forum.104  This is 
less likely in personal injury cases, due to the unpredictability of accidents 
and harm.105  For maintenance of interstate order, the concern is that 
application of an outside forum’s law would infringe on the sovereignty of 
the home forum.106  In a case of differing application of products liability 
law, this factor typically favors the state with the most significant contacts 
with the facts relevant to the litigation.107  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
has typically not given much weight to simplification of the judicial task 
outside of an absence of precedent indicating a true conflict exists between 
the laws, and have not traditionally followed the fifth factor of the better 
rule of law.108  The fourth factor identifies which law advances a significant 
interest of the forum.109  For product liability claims in Minnesota, the 
analysis will consider whether a direct and relevant connection occurs 
between a state and the facts underlying the litigation.110  However, if no 
factor favors either state, the state where the accident occurred will maintain 
the strongest governmental interest.111 
If Minnesota is the original venue and the application of the law is in 
conflict with North Dakota law and would be determinative, the North 
Dakota court is required to apply Minnesota’s choice of law analysis to 
determine which law will apply.112  Should the claim be filed in North 
Dakota, but one or more parties assert an outside jurisdiction’s case law 
applies, the relevant choice of law analysis for North Dakota requires a two-
pronged test.113  The first test is a significant contacts test where “all of the 
relevant contacts which might logically influence the decision of which law 
to apply” are considered by the court.114  In consideration of torts cases, the 
relevant contacts are “the place where the injury occurred; the place where 
 
103. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 2000). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 95. 
107. Hughes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 618, 620-21 (8th Cir. 2001). 
108. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d at 96-97. 
109. Id. at 95. 
110. Nelson v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., No. 06-63 (DSD/JJG), 2006 WL 1283896, at *4 (D. 
Minn. May 9, 2006). 
111. Id.; Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d at 92. 
112. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kamrath, 475 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2007). 
113. Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 756 (N.D. 1972). 
114. Daley v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 1998 ND 225, ¶ 12, 587 N.W.2d 159, 162 
(citing Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755 (N.D. 1972)). 
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the conduct causing the injury occurred; the domicile, nationality, 
residence, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties; and the 
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.”115 
The second prong centers on a choice-influencing test.116  Those 
factors are the same as the Minnesota test cited above.117  In cases of tort 
claims, including product liability claims, “the fourth and fifth factors are 
the most significant.”118  As strict liability of defective products falls into 
the tort category, those two prongs can weigh significantly on North Dakota 
choice of law, especially where litigation is based on an injury to a North 
Dakota plaintiff and occurred within the state of North Dakota.119  This 
likelihood may prevent litigation from originating in North Dakota.  
Practitioners filing suit should consider an alternative venue if the claim and 
recovery of damages depend on including a nonmanufacturing entity.  
Alternatively, retailers defending such a suit may consider the significant 
contacts of the case, relying on the domicile of the plaintiff and the location 
where the injury occurred, if it favors application of North Dakota law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s rejection of the apparent 
manufacturer doctrine in Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC120 resolves the split 
within the United States District Court of North Dakota established by the 
precedent set in Reiss.  The opinion firmly removes North Dakota from 
most other jurisdictions in imposing strict liability for defective products on 
nonmanufacturing sellers.  As a result, practitioners for both plaintiffs and 
defendants in product liability actions will need to consider closely which 
forum they choose in filing a claim based on the state’s applicable product 
liability statutory scheme, as well as what choice of law rules would apply.  
Moving for a change in venue as a defendant back to North Dakota may not 
relieve the defendant of liability.  However, North Dakota’s consideration 
of significant contacts within the state strongly favor applying the law of 
  
 
115. Id. ¶ 14 n.3. 
116. Polensky v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (D.N.D. 2005) (citing Robert 
A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 
(1966)). 
117. Polensky, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. 
118. Id. at 1170 (citing DeRemer v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 353 N.W.2d 694, 697 
(Minn. App. 1984); Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 252 A.2d 176, 180-81 (R.I. 
1969); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tenn. 1992)). 
119. Polensky, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1171. 
120. 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55. 
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the state where the accident occurred, and may give similar importance if 
the original venue’s choice of law analysis mirrors North Dakota’s rules. 
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